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Abstract
We present an experimental study on the wasted resources associated with tax
evasion. This waste arises from taxpayers and tax authorities, investing costly
e&ort in concealment, respectively detection, of tax evasion. We show that (socially
ine(cient) e&orts depend positively on the prevailing tax rate, but not on the *ne
which is imposed in case of detected tax evasion. The frequency of evasion increases
with tax rates. Additionally, we observe less tax evasion than a model with risk
neutral taxpayers predicts. We *nd evidence that this is rather due to individual
moral constraints than due to risk aversion.
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It is not clear what the welfare implications of tax evasion are. Some authors believe
that tax evasion itself constitutes a deadweight loss for society (e.g. Usher, 1986). Some
others point out the di(culty to asses welfare e&ects, since the state of the economy, the
e(ciency of the prevailing tax system, and social preferences over income distributions
are unknown (see Cowell, 1990, chp 7). In any case, tax evasion entails additional social
costs in the form of taxpayers investing e&ort and money in order to conceal tax evasion.
These social costs have to be added to the enforcement cost caused by tax the authority’s
auditing e&ort when the welfare implications of tax evasion are considered. Hence, a given
tax system does not only in@uence the amount of tax evasion or the size of a country’s
shadow economy (Schneider and Enste, 2000); it has also immediate consequences for
the extent of wastefully invested resources in the concealment-detection contest between
taxpayers and tax authority. Tax enforcement and covering measures going along with
cheating are costly not only for the individuals involved, but also for a society, since these
resources could be used for productive purposes otherwise. Consequently, this cost can
be viewed as an extra excess burden of taxation a society has to bear.
In this paper, we are interested in the in@uence of a tax system on these wastefully invested
resources. We present a model of a concealment-detection contest between taxpayer and
tax authority. The taxpayer can invest some of his income in order to shelter his eva-
sion behaviour1 while the tax authority spends resources on detection2. The probability
that tax evasion is detected decreases with the taxpayer’s concealment investment and
increases with the authority’s detection e&ort. Allowing for concealment and detection ef-
forts describes the tax-evasion decision more realistically than conventional models where
taxpayers have no means of covering their evasion and audit rates are exogenously *xed.3
1Think, for instance, of a taxpayer spending money or forgoing possible interest payments in order to
shelter black money abroad.
2Think of hiring more tax administrators to monitor tax reports or of investing in better detection
technology, which have been shown empirically to reduce tax evasion (see, for instance, Cebula, 2001).
3There are some earlier papers which allow for concealment of tax evasion (like Cremer and Gahvari,
1994) or which acknowledge that investing in income-detection technologies might raise the probability
of a successful audit by the tax authority (like in Usher, 1986). However, these papers do not model the
interaction between taxpayer and tax authority explicitly and do not focus on the extent of wastefully
invested resources in the context of tax evasion. Cremer and Gahvari (1994) rather explore the in@uence
of tax evasion and concealment on the design of an optimal linear income tax; Usher (1986) studies the
e&ects of concealment and detection e&ort on the marginal costs of public funds.
1In our model, we are able to investigate how tax rates and *nes in@uence the resources
wastefully invested for detection and concealment. Hence, we can determine the degree of
social (in)e(ciency of di&erent tax regimes. The less resources are wasted in the contest,
the more e(cient is the tax-collection and enforcement system. Our theoretical model
predicts that e(ciency decreases with higher tax rates, while the in@uence of *n e si sm o r e
complicated to predict.
We test our model predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental eco-
nomics provides an ideal methodological tool to measure the in@uence of di&erent tax
regimes on wastefully invested resources for concealment or detection of tax evasion. Ex-
perimentation in the laboratory is de*ned by controlled manipulation of independent
treatments (inducing di&erent tax regimes) and randomized assignment of participants
to those treatments. If di&erences between experimental groups on dependent variables
(i.e., concealment and detection e&ort) can be observed, these di&erences can be attributed
causally to di&erences in treatments (here: combinations of tax rates and *nes). In the
*eld, it is much more problematic to study the e(ciency costs of tax rates and *nes. (1),
it is hard to determine how precisely to measure concealment and detection e&orts. On
the side of the tax authority it might be feasible to approximate detection costs by the
costs for monitoring tax declarations, whereas on the side of the taxpayers it is less clear
which kind of expenditures (legal advice, bribes, expenses, forgone gains etc.) should be
subsumed under concealment costs. (2), even if there were consensus on how to measure
the e(ciency costs, data from taxpayers would be very hard to get, because nobody would
voluntarily want to reveal expenditures associated with illegal tax evasion. (3), given that
one has found a way around problem (2), to study the comparative static e&ects of dif-
ferent tax regimes would still require to expose taxpayers and tax authorities (randomly)
to di&erent tax regimes. This is hardly possible in reality, since because ‘real-life experi-
ments’ with tax regimes are very costly and/or are legally impossible on grounds of equal
treatment of taxpayers.4 In our experimental design, it is possible to satisfy the needs
4Slemrod et al. (2001) report a *eld experiment in Minnesota on the e&ects of an increased probability
of audit on taxpayer’s tax returns. They *nd that an increased probability of audit has a positive e&ect
on declared tax liability for low- and middle-income taxpayers, but the reverse e&ect for high-income
taxpayers. Even though highly original in their ’experimental’ design, one weakness of Slemrod et al.
(2001) is the fact that the increased probability of audit was indicated in a letter such that a certain
taxpayer “had been selected at random to be part of a study that will increase the number of taxpayers
whose 1994 individual income tax returns are closely examined” (p. 463). The authors themselves
acknowledge that there is no control on how *eld participants interpreted this loose information. A
similar problem of control in the *eld is present in a recent study by Wenzel and Taylor (2002) on the
e&ects of tax-reporting schedules on tax returns, where it remains open how di&erent tones in the letters
(cooperative vs. deterring) from the Australian Taxation O(ce to rental property owners were perceived.
2(1) through (3) and, hence, we can reliably test the e(ciency-cost e&ects of di&erent tax
regimes, i.e. of tax rates and *nes.
We *nd in our experiments that higher tax rates clearly reduce e(ciency, whereas higher
*nes do not have a signi*cant in@uence on e(ciency, i.e. they have no systematic e&ect
on concealment and detection costs. A further *nding of our experiment is that subjects
do not permanently evade taxes, even though we have set up the design such that tax
evasion is a better than fair gamble and, thus, risk neutral taxpayers should evade taxes all
the time. Alm et al. (1992) have already put forward that the real puzzle in tax evasion
is rather why people do pay taxes than why they try evading them. Like in the real
world, we can observe in our experiment a lot of honest taxpayers truthfully revealing
their income to the tax authority. A widely used explanation for this puzzle (see e.g.
Gordon, 1989, or Myles and Naylor, 1996) is the existence of some psychological cost for
cheating. Our model (based on Bayer, 2002) can be extended to account for such costs.
In the extension with moral costs, the theoretical model predicts that taxpayers without
any scruples always evade while taxpayers with moral constraints are at least sometimes
honest. We use this prediction in our laboratory experiment to identify whether moral
constraints really play a role in taxpayers’ evasion behaviour. We *nd that the existence of
moral costs is a valid explanation for honesty, which *ts better to the data than explaining
truthful declaration by assuming strong risk aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model
and derives the main predictions. Section 3 is devoted to our experimental design. Results
on the in@uence of tax rates and *nes are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section
5 analyzes individual behaviour more closely and provides some interpretations for be-
haviour deviating from the model predictions. A brief conclusion is o&ered in Section
6.
2 Timing, payo￿s, and experimental design
In this section, we explain the timing, information, and payo& structure underlying the
experiment. The experimentally implemented structure follows the theoretical model
developed in Bayer (2002). We begin with the timing.
32.1 Timing
Timing and information structure within one experimental round are the following:
1. Nature determines the actual income Y ￿ {0,y}. The probability that Y = y is
earned is given by ￿. This probability is common knowledge.
2. The taxpayer observes Y.
3. The taxpayer makes an income declaration D ￿ {0,y} and exerts a concealment
e&ort E ￿ {0,1,...,10}.
4. The authority observes the declaration D but not the concealment e&ort E.
5. The authority chooses a detection e&ort A ￿ {0,1,...,10}.
6. Nature decides whether the actual income is veri*able in court. The veri*cation
probability depends on the e&orts and is given by P(A,E), which is speci*ed below.
7. Taxpayer and authority are informed about the e&orts of the other party and
whether a *ne is due. Taxpayers receive their ex post net income U and the authority
receives the revenue R, respectively.
2.2 Action spaces and payo￿ structure
In this section we explain the underlying payo& structure for the experiment and comment
on the possible actions the subjects can take.
• We restrict the income distribution to two values 0 and y. Consequently, we restrict
the possible income declaration to be dichotomous as well:
Y =
￿
y with probability ￿
0 with probaility 1 ￿ ￿
D ￿ {y,0}
4• In order to keep the experiment simple we only allow for integer values for the
e&orts. The feasible e&orts (A,E) range from 0 to 10.
• E&ort costs are linear for both tax authority and taxpayer. One unit of concealment
e&ort costs the taxpayer ce experimental money units while for the authority the
detection cost per e&ort unit is given by ca.
• A st h ev e r i *cation-probability function we use:
P(A,E)=
￿
1 if A,E =0
A
A+E else . (1)
This probability function is widely used in the contest literature. Combined with
linear detection and concealment costs we achieve that the marginal cost of in@u-
encing the veri*cation probability in the favoured direction increases for both the
authority and the taxpayer. This seems to be a realistic feature, since authori-
ties and tax evaders should use the cheapest means of detection and concealment
respectively, before more expensive measures are taken.
• The tax system is linear and the *ne is proportional to the taxes evaded. The
potential *ne if evasion took place can be expressed as f · t · y , where t i st h et a x
rate and f denotes the *ne parameter.
Given this underlying structure the expected payo& per round for a taxpayer depending
on his declaration behaviour and true income becomes
EU(Y = y): =
￿
(1 ￿ t)y ￿ ce · E for D = y
y ￿ p(AE,E) · f · t · y ￿ ce · E for D =0 (2)
EU(Y =0 ) : =
￿
￿t · y ￿ ce · E for D = y
￿ce · E for D =0 (3)
where AE denotes the expected detection e&ort of the authority.
The expected payo& for the authority ER can be written as
ER(A): =
￿
µ · p(A,EE) · f · t · y ￿ ca · A for D =0
t · y ￿ ca · A for D = y , (4)
where µ is the belief that the zero declaration comes from a taxpayer who has an actual
income of y and EE denotes the expected concealment e&ort conditional on tax evasion
taking place.
52.3 Experimental design and parametrization
Two persons, called taxpayer and tax authority were paired for 20 rounds.5 In each round,
the tax authority received with a probability ￿ =0 .8 an income of Y = 1000 Taler. With
probability 1 ￿ ￿ t h ei n c o m ew a sY =0 . After observing the actual income the taxpayer
had to make an income declaration D ￿ {0,1000}. A declaration of 0 given that an income
of 1000 was earned constitutes the case of tax evasion. The other action the taxpayer had
to take is choosing his concealment e&ort E ￿ {0,1,...,10}, with marginal concealment
cost ce =2 0 . Without knowing the taxpayer’s real income Y , the tax authority had to
determine its detection e&ort A ￿ {0,1,...,10}, with marginal detection cost ca =4 0 .T h e
combination of E and A determined the probability that the real income of the taxpayer
could be veri*ed by the tax authority (see equation 1). Given this detection probability
nature decided, by using random number generated by the experimental software, whether
the actual income was veri*ed or not. In case of detected tax evasion, the taxpayer had
to pay a *ne, which depended on evaded tax (= 1000 · t) and a *ne parameter f.
We set up four di&erent treatments by exogenously varying tax rates and *nes. Tax
rates could be either 25% (Tl) or 40% (Th). Fines were proportional to the evaded tax
in case of detected tax evasion, by either adding a surcharge of 25% (Fl) or of 100%
(Fh) to the evaded tax. This was implemented by setting the *ne parameter f =1 .25
and f =2 ,respectively. The *ne - of course - had also to be paid to the tax authority.
The taxpayer’s payo& per round was calculated by subtracting taxes, the *ne if any and
concealment costs from the taxpayer’s e&ective income. We chose these treatments to
be able to distinguish between di&erent sets of incentives. Table 1 gives the taxpayer’s
payo&s net of concealment cost for the di&erent treatments given that the income was





Table 1: Taxpayer’s payo￿ net of concealment cost if the income was earned
5See the Appendix for a translation of the instructions.
6The tax authority earned a base wage of 450 Taler, plus the taxes (if income was declared
truthfully) or the *ne (if income was concealed, but detected), minus detection costs. At
the end of the experiment, 1000 Talers were exchanged for 1.2 Euro. The base wage per
round was introduced in order to ensure that the payo&s for authority and taxpayer are
not too di&erent. We perceive equitable payo&s as important, since we are not interested
in the e&ects of inequality aversion.
The experiment was run with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) in June 2002 at
the University of Innsbruck. For each treatment, we ran two sessions á 20 participants,
yielding 20 independent observations (pairs of taxpayer and tax authority) per treatment.
Average age of our 160 student participants was 22.7 years, with 59% being female. Two
thirds of participants were enrolled in business or economics, most of the others studied
law, medicine or psychology. On average, sessions lasted 45 minutes. Average earnings
were 12.6 Euro.
3 Predictions of the theoretical model
To start with, we assume risk-neutral subjects. This will give us a benchmark for be-
haviour and will allow us to draw conclusions about the reasons for deviations from this
benchmark.
Solving the model for the unique pooling equilibrium (i.e. a pure strategy Perfect Bayesian






2 · f · t · y · ce · ￿ if D =0










(0,0) if Y =0
(0,￿ · f · t · y · ca · ￿) if Y = y (6)





This set of strategies and beliefs are an equilibrium whenever evasion pays compared to





If this condition is violated a taxpayer who earned the income will mix between being
honest and evading. The equilibrium evasion probability ￿￿ conditional on having earned

















where ￿ = ca/ce is the comparative advantage in concealment over detection. It is possible
to show that lower *nes increase the probability that an actually earned income is evaded
in the case that always evading does not pay.8 Note, that here equilibrium e&orts A￿
and E￿ decrease if the equilibrium evasion probability ￿￿ decreases. This is driven by
the feature that the equilibrium beliefs for evasion µ￿ decrease if ￿￿ decreases. In this
formulation the tax rate should have no in@uence on the evasion probability.
We chose the parameters such that evasion, given optimal e&orts, always pays for risk
neutral taxpayers. Therefore, we might expect that a taxpayer always evades if his income
is 1000. In fact the expected declaration should always be 0. The authority’s belief to
face an evader should be equal to the earnings probability, i.e. µ￿ = ￿ =0 .8. Solving for
the optimal e&ort and taking the experiment’s discontinuous action space into account
gives the following prediction of optimal e&orts, as summarized in Table 2:
treatment(tax/*ne)
optimal e&ort of actual/observed action TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
taxpayer - evasion 3 5 5 8
tax authority - declare = 0 1 2 2 3
Table 2: Optimal e￿orts for risk-neutrality
7For the derivation see Bayer (2002).
8This is true, since ￿￿￿/￿f<0 for ￿￿ ￿ [0,1].
8With these equilibrium e&orts we can calculate the expected e(ciency. The expected




Then the expected e(ciency V in percent is given by one minus the ratio of expected
waste to expected income.




This yields the predicted e(ciency per treatment stated in Table 3. We see that higher
*nes should decrease e(ciency for given tax rates as higher tax rates for given *nes do.
treatment(tax/*ne)
predicted TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
e(ciency 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.69
Table 3: Predicted E￿ciency per treatment
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Descriptive overview
Table 4 presents some fundamental descriptive data of the experiment. Recall that the
actual gross income was determined by a random draw (with 80% probability for gross
income Y = 1000, and 20% probability for Y =0 ). Declared income can be either 1000
or zero. If a subject gets Y = 1000, but declares zero income, he is classi*ed as evading
the tax. The relative frequency of tax evasion ranges from 40% in treatment TlFh (with
low taxes, but a high *ne) to 59% in treatment ThFl (with high taxes, but a low *ne).
Even though it would be optimal for risk-neutral subjects to evade all the time, many
subjects mix in their decision between evasion and truthful declaration.9 The frequency
of changing from evading the tax to truthtelling (and the reverse) is summarized in the
variable “Degree of switching”. The higher the value of the variable, the more often
9The discussion of possible reasons for truthful declaration will follow in Section 5.
9a subject changes from evasion to non-evasion and reverse within the 20 rounds of the
experiment.
The probability of the detection of tax evasion is dependent on the taxpayer’s and the tax
authority’s e&orts for concealment and detection. E&orts are summarized in table 6 below.
Detected tax evasion leads to *nes, which are highest in absolute terms in treatment ThFh,
and lowest in treatment TlFl. Taxpayers’ pro*ts are highest in treatment TlFl and lowest
in treatment ThFh, whereas the reverse holds true for tax authorities.
treatment(tax/*ne)
Averages per treatment (N =2 0 ) TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Real income (Y ) 16150 14700 15850 16200
Declared income (D) 8800 8850 6250 6950
Absolute frequency of tax evasion 7.35 5.85 9.60 9.25
Relative frequency of tax evasion (given Y = 1000) 0.45 0.40 0.59 0.57
Absolute frequency of paying a *ne 2.40 2.50 3.60 3.10
Sum of *nes 750 1250 1800 2480
Pro*t taxpayer 12281 10404 9875 9345
Pro*t tax authority 10424 10329 10508 11144
Degree of switching (if Y = 1000) 4.65 5.80 5.30 7.80
Real tax declaration *lled out (1 = yes) (N =4 0 ) 0.65 0.53 0.65 0.55
Student of economics and business (1 = yes) (N =4 0 ) 0.55 0.80 0.63 0.65
Age (N =4 0 ) 22.1 22.0 24.3 22.4
Table 4: Descriptive data
4.2 Frequency of evasion
Even though the theoretical prediction would be full evasion in any treatment, we *nd
that the frequencies of evasion are well below one hundred percent in all treatments, with
averages ranging from 40% in TlFh (with low tax rate and high *ne) to 59% in ThFl.S o
we can explore how the evasion frequencies vary with tax rates and *nes. We *nd that
the relative frequency of tax evasion is lower in treatment TlFh than in treatments ThFh
(p =0 .048, Mann-Whitney U-test) and ThFl (p =0 .026), respectively. However, the
10di&erence in evasion frequencies between ThFl and TlFl is not signi*cant despite of the
considerable di&erence of population means (0.59 to 0.45). In general, the results seem to
imply that tax evasion is more prevalent with higher tax rates, but does not systematically
depend on the magnitude of the *ne.
Result 1 Higher tax rates tend to lead to more tax evasion, while higher #nes reduce tax
evasion only if taxes are low.
treatment (tax/*ne)
Relative frequency of tax evasion in rounds TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Overall 0.45 0.40 0.59 0.57
Rounds 1-10 0.41 0.40 0.58 0.51
Rounds 11-20 0.50 0.40 0.62 0.63
N =2 0per treatment
Table 5: Frequency of evasion
Table 5 compares the relative frequencies of tax evasion in the *rst halfe of the experiment
with those in the second. With the exception of treatment TlFh, tax evasion frequencies
rise in the second half, with the increase being signi*cant in treatments TlFl (p =0 .01,
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test) and ThFh (p =0 .003).
Testing for the degree of switching between evade/not-evade, we *nd that this is signi*-
cantly more frequent in treatment ThFh than in any other treatment (with p =0 .004 vs.
TlFl, p =0 .034 vs. TlFh,a n dp =0 .012 vs. ThFl, Mann-Whitney U-test), whereas all
other three treatments show no signi*cant di&erences in pairwise comparisons. Interest-
ingly, the degree of switching is not signi*cantly correlated to any measure of e&ort.
4.3 Concealment and detection e￿orts
Aggregate data Table 6 shows average e&ort levels of taxpayers and tax authorities.10
In the upper part of Table 6 we report the predicted optimal e&ort, which is based
10Regarding e&ort levels in the *rst and second half of the experiment, there is no signi*cant increase
or decrease in e&ort levels from rounds 1-10 to rounds 11-20.
11on permanent evasion. The lower part shows the actual data on average e&ort in case
of taxpayers evading the tax, respectively in case a tax authority notices a taxpayer’s
declaration of zero.11
treatment(tax/*ne)
Predicted optimal e&ort TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
- evasion taxpayer 3 5 5 8
- declare = 0 authority 1 2 2 3
Actual e&ort
avg. e&ort - evasion taxpayer 4.91 6.49 7.82 7.95
avg. e&ort - declare = 0 authority 2.83 4.11 4.82 5.61
Table 6: E￿ort levels per round
We *nd that the e&ort levels in our experiment are much higher than the theory predicts.
Apart from the taxpayers’ evasion e&orts in treatment ThFh,t h el e v e l sa r ee v e na b o v et h e
prediction for evasion with probability one. Recall that the e&orts should decrease with
lower evasion probabilities. Given the empirical evasion probabilities (see Table 5) the
empirical e&orts are excessively high.12 However, more important is testing for treatment
di&erences in e&ort levels in case of evasion (or presumed evasion from the perspective of
the tax authority). Again, there is a general treatment e&ect (p =0 .001, Kruskal-Wallis
test). In particular, e&orts of taxpayers in case of evasion are lower in TlFl than in any
other treatment (p<0.05 for any pairwise comparison, Mann-Whitney U-test) and lower
in TlFh than in ThFh (p =0 .037)o rThFl (p =0 .048). Concerning tax authorities’ e&orts,
they are signi*cantly lower in TlFl than in all other treatments (p<0.05 in any pairwise
comparison, Mann-Whitney U-test). Furthermore, authorities’ e&orts are lower in TlFh
than in ThFh (p<0.01).
11In rounds 1-10, 39 (out of 80) tax payers choose at least one time a positive e&ort level although they
do not evade the tax (either by declaring full income Y = 1000 or by declaring zero income if Y =0 ).
In rounds 11-20, only 16 tax payers do the same. The decline in covering without tax evasion is clearly
signifant (p<0.01, ￿2-test). Whereas choosing a positive e&ort in case of zero real income might be
considered as strategically motivated (in order to make it harder for the tax authority to detect tax
evasion), positive e&ort in case of declaring full income has to be considered as irrational or as a mistake.
Actually, 35% of participants commit such a mistake at least once, 12% of participants more than twice.
12We explore the reasons for this behaviour in Section 5.
12Summarizing these results we can say that for given *ne parameters the e&orts of taxpayers
and authorities are signi*cantly higher if tax rates are high. However, checking the impact
of *nes for given tax rates, we *nd again that the relationship is not that clear. Higher
*n e so n l yl e a dt om o r ee &ort if tax rates are low, too.
Result 2 Higher tax rates ceteris paribus lead to higher e￿ort levels, while #nes have no
unequivocal in)uence.
Individual data In the following we examine detection and concealment e&orts on the
individual level. We start by presenting the distribution of e&orts, separately for taxpayers
and tax authorities, in our four di&erent treatments. Afterwards, we are going to explore



















Figure 1: Taxpayers’ e￿orts if evasion took place
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of concealment e&orts if tax evasion took place.
We see that the distributions di&er considerably between treatments. For high tax rates
(see the right hand side of Figure 1) the relative frequency of high concealment e&orts is
greater than under low tax rates.13
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Figure 2: Authorities’ e￿orts for zero-declarations
In Figure 2 we plot the relative frequencies of detection e&orts if the authority observed
a zero declaration. It is evident that under high taxes the relative frequency of very high
detection e&orts (such as 10) is greater than under low taxes. Furthermore we see that
exerting no e&ort or a very high e&ort seem to be focal points under the high tax-rate
treatments (right hand side of Figure 2). Examining the individual data we *nd that some
authorities mix between e&orts of 0 and 10. Such a behaviour is observed with real-world
tax authorities (random full-scale audits), while our model does not predict any mixing.
Next, we examine the relation between taxpayers’ and authorities’ e&orts. Does an in-
creased e&ort of one of the parties lead to an escalation of e&orts or does one of the actors
eventually back down? In the aggregate, our data suggest that escalation is the more
likely event, since the average e&orts are highly correlated within pairs (with correlation
coe(cient r =0 .7; p<0.01; N =8 0 ). This means that high e&orts of the tax author-
ity are typically countered by high e&orts of the taxpayer and vice versa. However, this
result is driven by the low tax-treatments only. Figures 3 to 6 show the frequency of
e&ort combinations of taxpayers and tax authorities (with single round data as the basis)
separately for our four treatments. The correlation of both parties’ e&orts is only signif-
icantly positive in our low-tax-treatments TlFl (Figure 3, r =0 .64; p<0.01)a n dTlFh
14(Figure 5, r =0 .54; p =0 .017). In both high-tax-treatments, the two most frequent e&ort
combinations (E,A) are (10,0) and (10,10). This can be interpreted as the taxpayer’s
intention of strategic teaching14, which - if failing - leads to a tough contest with (10,10),
or - if successful - to no auditing at all (10,0). However, no tax evader was actually able to
induce the tax authority to back down completely over a large number of rounds by high
evasion e&orts. The attempt of strategic teaching usually led to an escalation of e&orts
instead. This may partly explain our excessively high e&ort levels.
Result 3 E￿orts of authority and taxpayer are correlated for low taxes, while high taxes
lead to tax authorities mixing between very high and low e￿orts.
Figure 7 indicates the relative frequencies of tax authorities’ e&ort choices for honest
zero-declarations of taxpayers. It is interesting to note that in treatment TlFl authorities
choose zero e&ort in more than one third of cases. This is an indication that they are
relatively good in anticipating the truthfulness of the taxpayer’s declaration. On the
contrary, in treatment ThFh the modal category of detection e&orts is 9 or 10.
Furthermore, it is evident that tax authorities over the course of the experiment tried to
punish notorious cheats by exerting high e&orts in order to raise the detection probability.
As a consequence, the partial correlation between evasion frequency and e&orts of the
authority is r =0 .47 (p<0.01), controlling for the e&orts of the taxpayers in order to
eliminate the escalation e&ect described above.
Result 4 High evasion frequencies induce high e￿orts by the tax authority.
4.4 E-ciency and tax revenue
We turn to the analysis of the e(ciency levels in di&erent treatments. E(ciency here
refers to the amount of income that is not wasted in the detection-concealment contest.
14Camerer et al. (2002) coined the terminology “strategic teaching” in a learning context.
15Figure 3: E￿ort combinations for treatment TlFh
Figure 4: E￿ort combinations for treatment ThFh
16Figure 5: E￿ort combinations for the treatment TlFl
Figure 6: E￿ort combinations for treatment ThFl
17Figure 7: Authorities’ e￿orts for truthfull zero-declarations
We calculated an e(ciency measure for every pair of subjects. This measure gives the
percentage of income created in a relationship that is not invested into wasteful detection
and concealment. Figure 8 shows the e(ciency distributions for the di&erent treatments.
While in the low-tax low-*ne treatment (TlFl) about 40 percent of pairs achieved more
than 90 percent e(ciency, not a single pair was able to sustain such a high e(ciency level
in the high-tax high-*ne treatment (ThFh). A Kruskal-Wallis test con*rms that there is
a treatment e&ect with respect to e(ciency (p<0.01, df =3 , N =8 0 ). Table 7 below
s h o w st h ea v e r a g ee (ciency levels as well as the predicted ones.
Treatment TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Actual e(ciency 84.9 79.8 71.8 70.9
Predicted e(ciency 89.0 80.0 80.0 69.0
Table 7: E￿ciency by treatment
Moreover, testing for pairwise di&erences with a Mann-Whitney U-test shows that low
taxes lead to higher e(ciency. E(ciency is higher with low taxes than with high taxes,
both under low *nes (p<0.01) and under high *nes (p =0 .028). The in@uence of *nes
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Figure 8: E￿ciency of pairs per treatment
have a large in@uence on tax-evasion frequencies. However, if both taxes and *nes are
high then e(ciency is considerably lower than in the case where *nes and taxes are low
(p<0.01).
Result 5 Higher tax rates lead to lower e￿ciency, while the in)uence of #nes is not
signi#cant.
It is interesting to check whether the sacri*ce of some e(ciency by increasing tax rates
at least induces a higher revenue for the government. The surprising answer is that this
i sn o tn e c e s s a r i l yt r u ei fo n et a k e st h ee n f o r c e m e n te &ort into account.
Revenue (total for all rounds) treatment(tax/*ne)
TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
Tax revenue 2200 2212.5 2500 2780
Taxes recovered by audits 600 625 1440 1240
Fines 750 1250 1800 2480
￿ Enforcement Cost ￿1126 ￿1758.5 ￿3232 ￿3356
Total net revenue 2424 2329 2508 3144
Net revenue in percent of income 15.01 5 .81 5 .81 9 .4
Table 8: Average revenues by treatment
19Table 8 above summarizes the average revenue (summed over all 20 rounds) by treatments.
Higher tax rates lead to higher tax revenues, higher taxes recovered by audits, and higher
revenues from *nes. However, if the enforcment cost (e&ort cost of the authority) is
deducted then the di&erences in total net revenue are small. In fact, pairwise Mann-
Whitney U-tests indicate that there are no statistically signi*cant di&erences in total net
revenues among treatments. Higher taxes tend only to increase net revenue - if at all -
when they are backed up by high *nes.
Result 6 Higher taxes do not lead to a signi#cantly higher net revenue if enforcement
costs are deducted.
4.5 The e￿ects of detected tax evasion
In this section, we are going to examine taxpayers’ and tax authorities’ future play after
tax evasion was detected. In principle, the detection of tax evasion in round t can have
two di&erent e&ects on the taxpayer’s side. Either the taxpayer switches to truthfully
reporting the full income in the next round ehen he has income Y = 1000,o rt h et a x p a y e r
sticks to evading taxes by declaring zero income, but increases his concealment e&ort.
The tax authority can react to detected tax evasion by changing the detection e&ort in
the next round when the taxpayer declares zero income.
In total, tax evasion was detected and a *ne had to be paid in 232 out of 641 cases of
tax evasion (see also Table 1 for the absolute frequency of paying a *ne in our di&erent
treatments). Table 9 summarizes taxpayers’ and tax authorities’ reactions to detection in
round t.T h e*rst row indicates the average frequency of truthful declaration in the next
round (with Y = 1000). Note that switching to truthful declaration is most probable in
our treatments with high *nes, and least probable with low *nes. Given low tax rates, the
in@uence of the *n e ’ ss i z ei ss i g n i *cant. High *nes lead to a considerably higher frequency
of full declaration than low *nes (p<0.05; one-sided Mann-Whitney U-test). With high
tax rates, the di&erence is not statistically signi*cant.
20Relative frequency of TlFl TlFh ThFl ThFh
- truthful declaration￿,+ 0.40 0.73 0.46 0.55
- increasing concealment e&ort￿,# 0.69 0.72 0.77 0.56
- increasing detection e&ort￿,˜ 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.15
Notes
￿ averages are taken across subjects with a given treatment.
+ data refer to the next round with Y = 1000.
# data refer to the next round with Y = 1000 and D =0 .
˜ data refer to the next round with D =0 .
Table 9: Reaction to detection in round t
If taxpayers continue to evade taxes in round t +1(or the next round with Y = 1000)
after detection in round t, their concealment e&ort increases, on average, in about two
thirds of the cases. The increase in concealment e&ort is signi*cantly di&erent from a
random draw (p<0.05, binomial test) for all treatments, except ThFh.
Interestingly, tax authorities react strikingly di&erent to detection in round t. The next
time a taxpayer declares zero income (D =0 ) after detection in round t, detection e&ort
is increased in less than 20% of cases, on average. The decrease in detection e&ort is
signi*cantly di&erent from a random draw (p<0.05, binomial test) for all treatments.15
Hence, whereas taxpayers who continue to evade taxes increase their concealment e&ort in
order to reduce the probability of being caught cheating on taxes, tax authorities reduce
their detection e&ort in more than 80% of cases when they face a zero income-declaration
the next time. This might be due to tax authorities expecting taxpayers to switch to
truthful declaration of income after su&ering a *ne from detected tax evasion in round t.
Result 7 After being caught taxpayers switch to honesty more often if #nes are high. Tax-
payers who still evade tend to increase the concealment e￿ort, while tax authorities
do not anticipate this and consequently reduce their detection e￿ort.
15Applying a Wilcoxon-signed ranks test to the relative frequency of increasing concealment e&ort,
respectively detection e&ort, within a given pair of taxpayer and tax authority, we can con*rm that
taxpayers increase their e&ort signi*cantly more often than tax authorities (p<0.05 for any treatment
separately, two-sided test).
215 Why do people pay taxes?
In this section we explore brie@y why in the experiment taxpayers did not always evade
taxes even though this would have been pro*table. Since it was not the main purpose of
our experiment to address this question there may be many di&erent possible explanations
our experimental design cannot discriminate between. So this section gives some ex-post
interpretations, which, although plausible, should be further examined by experiments
tailored to discriminate between those and possible alternative explanations.
There are two main reasons why people would choose not to evade even if the evasion is a
better than fair gamble: risk aversion and moral constraints. Recall that a taxpayer should
always evades if his utility from being honest is smaller than the expected equilibrium
utility from evasion. To be willing to mix between truthful declaration and evasion the
following has to hold, where (C1) is for expected utility theory and (C2) is for expected
value maximization with moral constraints, which cause some moral cost K in case of
evasion.16
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Here Yh is the net income for truthful declaration, Y the gross income for successful
evasion, and Y gives the payo& if evasion is detected. We see that for (C1) under risk
aversion (U￿ > 0 and U￿￿ < 0) the expected payo& for evasion has to be greater than
the certain net income after truthful declaration. This directly follows from Jensens’
Inequality. The same is true for the moral constraint condition (C2). There the expected
payo& from evading has to exceed the certainty equivalent by the moral cost K. If we
now compare the payo&s in the experiment with the certainty equivalent we *nd out that
on average the taxpayers earned less than they would have if they would have declared
always truthfully. This is also con*rmed by a statistical test. The payo&sf o rt h et a x p a y e r s
are signi*cantly smaller than the net income after truthful declaration (p =0 .03,o n e -
sided Wilcoxon-Test, N =8 0 ).17 Consequently, both hypotheses alone cannot explain
16A hybrid equilibrium where the taxpayer mixes between truthful revelation and evasion if he earned
the income requires that the taxpayer is indi&erent between evasion and non-evasion in that case.
17We calculated and used the di&erence between actual payo& and hypothetical honesty payo& for every
taxpayer over the 20 rounds for the statistical test.
22that taxpayers were sometimes honest. On the contrary, this *nding even suggests that
taxpayers were risk-loving. This immediately becomes plausible if one takes the framing
of the situation into account. Taxpayers earn an income and then have to pay taxes. If
taxpayers use their gross income as a reference point the tax liability is perceived as a loss.
According to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) people are loss-averse. A
further indication for loss-aversion are the high e&orts in the experiment (compared to
e&orts predicted under risk-neutrality). It is possible to show that loss-aversion tends to
increase e&orts.18
If taxpayers are loss-averse, it still remains to be explained why they frequently truthfully
reported their income. The reason why that may have been the case becomes clearer if we
look at some subjects showing the rather radical behaviour of always truthfully reporting
the income. In the experiment 7.5 percent of the taxpayers always reported their gross
income correctly. There is no utility function (not even extreme risk-aversion) that can
explain this behaviour. For an explanation we come back to moral constraints. If we
allow for moral constraints, i.e. an additional psychological cost K of non-compliance,
the behaviour becomes explainable. Then the honest taxpayers did choose to truthfully
reveal their income because they had very high scruples.19
So a combination of loss-aversion and scruples is a plausible explanation for the behaviour
of taxpayers. Their behaviour, however, might be highly in@uenced by the tax authorities’
detection e&orts. In the low tax treatment the authorities’ behaviour is roughly consistent
with the prediction of our model. The fact that in the high tax treatments tax authorities
frequently switch from very high to very low detection e&orts and vice versa is a bit
puzzling. Our tentative explanation would be that the perceived intentions play a role. A
higher tax widens the payo& spread for the authority between tax compliance and evasion.
Therefore the perceived intention of an evader as perceived by the authority should be
worse under higher tax rates. So if people react to bad intentions with punishment (see
Charness and Rabin, 2002 or Falk et al., 2003) then the high e&orts could be explained by
the attempt to punish the taxpayer. These high e&orts, though, are very expensive, such
that a subject only wants to punish if it is certain enough that the opponent cheated.20
18Proofs for some utility functions can be obtained from the authors.
19Note that anticipation of a very high detection e&ort by the authority or reputation-building was not
the reason for taxpayers being truthful. The tax authorities who faced zero-declarations of permanently
honest taxpayers frequently anticipated this and repeatedly chose a detection e&ort of zero. So a one-o&
evasion would have been very pro*table in monetary terms.
20The tax authority’s mixing between very high and very low e&orts alternatively can be the result of
overcon*dence with respect to the guess whether the taxpayer cheated or not, leading to beliefs close to
0 or 1. It is not clear however, why this should happen under high tax rates only.
236 Conclusion
Tax evasion is a prevailing phenomenon in most countries. Besides having a negative
e&ect of cutting the state’s budgetary scope, tax evasion may entail an excess burden
by inducing both taxpayers and tax authorities alike to invest unproductively and waste
resources in order to conceal, respectively detect, tax evasion. Bayer (2002) has shown
that higher tax rates lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in the amount of wastefully
invested resources. This theoretical hypothesis is con*rmed in our experiment. On the
contrary, *nes have been found not to have a signi*cant in@uence on the ine(ciencies
created by the tax collection and enforcement system. Hence, tax rates, but not *nes, are
the driving force for a tax regime’s excess burden.
Tax rates also play a prominent role in in@uencing the scope of tax evasion. Our exper-
iment shows that tax rates tend to have a sign*cantly positive in@uence on tax evasion.
Fines, however, failed to signi*cantly in@uence tax-evasion behaviour. A better deterrent
proved to be the experience of being caught when *nes are high. A majority of tax cheats
turned to honest taxpayers after having been caught provided that the *nes are high. Low
*nes, however, do not have this catharsis e&ect due to painful experience. This suggests
that *nes and audit e&ort are rather complements than substitutes for tax enforcement.
As more convictions of tax cheats are an expensive mean for reducing tax evasion, since
this increases enforcement costs, one might want to consider alternative measures. In our
experiment lower taxes proved to be a very good alternative. Lower taxes reduced tax
evasion and ine(ciencies without leading to a signi*cant drop in net revenue. High taxes
only tended to increase the net revenue - though not signi*cantly in a statistical sense - if
in addition high *nes applied. This *nding gives another rationale for keeping tax rates
low, additionally to the well known disincentive e&ects of high tax rates.
The relatively high frequency of taxpayers’ truthfully reporting their income can be ac-
counted for in a model which assumes moral constraints or scruples on the side of tax-
payers. Such moral constraints may provide an e&ective deterrent to tax evasion. The
perception of the tax system to be fair, government spending to be e(cient and politicians
to be men of integrity has been shown to reduce tax evasion (Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann, 1996). The underlying reason for this *nding might be that these percep-
tions foster positive attitudes toward the state and taxation which become behaviourally
relevant by increasing tax-evasion scruples and, thus, reducing tax evasion.
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Appendix - Experimental instructions
Instructions (originally in German)
We provide the instructions for the ThFh-treatment. In treatments with the low tax rate
(TlFx) the tax rate was set at 25% instead. In treatments with the low #ne (TxFl ), the
#ne consisted of the evaded tax plus an additional payment of one quarter of the evaded
tax.
Welcome to the experiment!
We kindly ask you not to talk to other participants until the end of the experiment.
In this experiment, there are two di&erent roles, taxpayer and tax authority. The experi-
mental currency is denoted as Taler. The exchange rate is set at
261000 Taler = 1.2 Euro.
One taxpayer and one tax authority will be paired for the whole experiment, i.e. there
are *xed pairs. The experiment consists of 21 identical rounds. The *rst one of these will
be a trial round which will not be paid.
A. Sequence of events in each round
At the start of each round there is a random draw on the taxpayer’s income in this round.
With a probability of 80% the taxpayer receives 1000 Talers as income. With a probability
of 20% the taxpayer’s income is zero.
The taxpayer gets informed about his income (either 0 or 1000 Taler) and has to decide
whether or not to declare his income to the tax authority (either 0 or 1000 Taler). Further-
more, the taxpayer has to decide on a concealment e￿ort ( r a n g i n gf r o m0t o1 0p o i n t s ) .
Positive concealment e&ort causes costs, which will be speci*ed below. The higher the
chosen concealment e&ort, the less likely it becomes that the tax authority will be able to
verify the taxpayer’s real income.
The tax authority learns about the taxpayer’s declared income. Note that the tax author-
ity gets no information about the real income of the taxpayer, nor about the taxpayer’s
concealment e&ort. The tax authority has to choose a detection e￿ort (ranging from 0 to
10 points). Positive detection e&ort is costly. The higher the chosen detection e&ort, the
more likely the tax authority will be able to verify the taxpayer’s real income.
The combination of concealment e&ort and detection e&ort determines the probability
of verifying the taxpayer’s real income, as will be explained in detail below. Given this
probability, a random draw will determine whether the taxpayer’s real income will be
veri*ed or not.
After each round both the taxpayer and the tax authority will be informed about the
taxpayer’s concealment e&ort and the tax authority’s detection e&ort, as well as whether
the real income could be veri*ed by the tax authority.
27B. Payo￿sp e rr o u n d
1. Taxpayer’s payo￿
payo& = real income - taxes - potential *ne - costs of concealment e&ort
• Taxes: Declared income * tax rate: The tax rate equals 40%.
• Fine: The taxpayer has to pay a *ne in case he/she has declared zero income
although real income is 1000 Talers, and if the tax authority was able to verify the
real income. The *ne consists of the evaded tax (= real income * tax rate = 400
Taler) plus an additional payment of equal size (= 400 Taler). Hence, the potential
*ne amounts in total to 800 Taler.
• Costs of concealment e&ort:
Concealment e&ort (points) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Costs (in Taler) 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
2. Tax authority’s payo￿
payo& = basic wage + taxes + potential *ne - costs of detection e&ort
• Basic wage: 450 Taler
• Taxes: Declared income * Tax rate (40%)
• Fine: If the real income is veri*ed and the taxpayer declared less than his/her real
income, the tax authority receives the *ne of 800 Taler (for the composition of the
*n es e ea b o v e ) .
• Costs of detection e&ort:
28Detection e&ort (points) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Costs (in Taler) 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
C. The probability of detection
The following table shows, how the combination of concealment e&ort and detection e&ort
determines the probability of verifying the real income. Figures in the table denote
percentages.
Detection e&ort
Points 0123456789 1 0
Concealment 0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
e&ort 1 0 50 67 75 80 83 86 88 89 90 91
2 0 33 50 60 67 71 75 78 80 82 83
3 0 25 40 50 57 63 67 70 73 75 77
4 0 20 33 43 50 56 60 64 67 69 71
5 0 17 29 38 44 50 55 58 62 64 67
6 0 14 25 33 40 45 50 54 57 60 63
7 0 13 22 30 36 42 46 50 53 56 59
8 0 11 20 27 33 38 43 47 50 53 56
9 0 10 18 25 31 36 40 44 47 50 53
10 0 9 17 23 29 33 38 41 44 47 50
Example: If the tax authority chooses a detection e&ort of 7 points and the taxpayer a
concealment e&ort of 2 points, then the detection probability is 78%. Imagine an urn
with 100 balls, numbered consecutively from 1 to 100. If in a random draw a ball with
a number from 1 to 78 is drawn, then the real income is veri*e da n dk n o w nt ot h et a x
authority. If a ball with a number from 79 to 100 is drawn, the taxpayer’s real income
remains concealed.
29